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Decentralisation is again growing in popularity among
developing countries. There is a strong rationale for delegating
greater responsibility for public decision-making and service
delivery to local governments. Research suggests that giving
local communities more say in policy decisions can enhance
accountability, empower citizens and improve the quality of
service delivery.
But as the responsibilities delegated to local governments
increase, so must the funding. And revenue mobilisation is a
particular challenge in countries where few people work in the
formal economy and contribute to the income tax base. Finding
supplementary sources of funding for community public goods
is a pressing policy issue.
One option is to supplement government funding for local
public goods with contributions from communities themselves.
There is a long history of fundraising in religious organisations
across Africa, for local and faraway causes. And given the
significant amounts of money being sent home by migrants, a
community’s diaspora could also contribute. But in trying to
collect donations for public projects, we run into the classic
‘free-rider problem’. Even though citizens might all individually
value a new road, public toilet or water pump, each person will
contribute less than their fair share to its cost, expecting their
neighbours to make up the difference.
Just as a wealth of experiments and impact evaluations have
shown that the poor can and will save if given the right tools
and incentives, the free-rider problem can be alleviated by
changing the incentives to contribute. The fundraising industry
has developed a range of techniques to encourage individuals to
donate money. For example, charities have found that people
give more if their donations are matched by a third party. Tax
deductions for charitable contributions are a common way of
doing this. Similarly, people may be concerned that their
donation will be wasted if no-one else contributes and the
project is underfunded. In this situation, offering a ‘money-back
guarantee’ that the project will be fully funded has been shown
to increase donations in laboratory experiments.
If these techniques can be used to encourage charitable
donations, might they also work in raising funds for community
projects? With the support of the IGC, we designed a field
experiment to test this hypothesis in four rural communities in
southern Ghana. Who would donate to a fundraiser for local
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southern Ghana. Who would donate to a fundraiser for local
public goods, and how much would they give? Would the
added incentive of a matching offer or money-back guarantee
encourage them to give more?
To kick off the experiment, our survey team called the residents
of each community to a public meeting. We explained that we
would be raising funds from the residents to pay for a small
community construction project. Supposing the community
could raise around 1,000 Ghana cedis, what would they most
like to spend that money on?1 After some lively discussions and
voting, three of the communities decided to raise funds for the
construction or renovation of school buildings. The other
community elected to build a maternity ward for an existing
health clinic.
We conducted five rounds of the fundraising experiment, once
every two months during 2009. In each of the four
communities, we invited about 150 adults (randomly selected
for a concurrent survey) to participate. In a closed room, we
met with each participant in turn, and gave them a small
amount of money as compensation for their time. They then
drew a token to determine whether we would match their
donation, and the proportion (between a half and 2) of the
match. For example, if they drew a match ratio of 1, we would
match their donation to the project one-to-one. If they drew a
ratio of zero, there would be no match. Randomly varying the
proportion of each participant’s match gave us a control group
of individuals who did not receive a match offer, and also
allowed us to test whether the size of the matching grant had an
effect on donations. We explained the matching concept
carefully to the participant, and asked them how much they
wanted to donate. Donations were entirely voluntary and their
decision was kept private. If the participant chose to donate, the
contribution and the match were then put in the fundraising
box.
In the last two rounds of fundraising, we added a money-back
guarantee. We announced a funding target for the project, and
explained how much had already been raised. If the target was
not reached, we explained, every participant would have their
donations for the last two rounds refunded. In the end, the
fundraising targets were met in all four communities and the
four projects were completed. Some community members
contributed additional materials and labour to the construction.
The results from the study were very interesting. First, we found
that almost all of the participants were willing to donate, and
some contributed money in excess of what we had paid them
for attendance. The matching grant offer raised donations by
over 10% on average, and we found that a higher match ratio
led to more generous donations. The money-back guarantee
had an even greater effect on donations, almost doubling the
amount contributed.
The next step would be to pilot these ideas on a larger scale.
Local governments could employ these techniques to
supplement funding for small infrastructure projects. The
community might be required to raise a certain fraction – say
10% – of the funds for the project, the remainder being a
‘match’ from the government. The money-back guarantee could
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be incorporated by setting a condition that pledges would be
refunded (and the project abandoned) if the target is not met.
This would help avoid the government funding projects for
which there is insufficient community interest. With
contributions from remittances and the participation of
religious organisations, more ambitious fundraising goals could
be set.
Whether this scheme can work in practice will depend on the
quality of implementation and the setting. It may work for
some communities and projects, and not others. But our
experiment in southern Ghana suggests that with the right
incentives and leadership, people are prepared to contribute to
the cost of small public goods for their communities.
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Notes
[1] 1,000 Ghana cedis was roughly equal to US$700 at the time
of the study.
